Nowadays, with the rapid development of economy, to promote the development of low carbon economy, how to effectively take measures to guide carbon trading has become a problem demanding prompt solution for governments. This study takes government and enterprises as the main body, analyses how government and enterprises take measures to achieve maximum benefits under different corporate carbon trading willingness using complete information dynamic game model. The results show that under different input and output, the government and businesses will get different earnings, and government and enterprises should adjust strategies according to actual conditions.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid economic growth has inevitably brought carbon emissions generated by energy consumption and the deterioration of ecological environment. China has become the world's fastest growing country in carbon dioxide emissions, which has attracted great attention to the low carbon economy. At present, China has become the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, so it is extremely urgent to develop low carbon economy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In response to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as well as global climatic deterioration, the widespread campaign for economic and social changes has been launched around the globe, and the low-carbon economy characterized by low pollution, low power consumption and low emissions has come to a global consensus.
RESEARCH STATUS OF CORPORATE CARBON TRADE
Carbon trade could revitalize the corporate carbon emission power, and help enterprises to complete the objective assessment of government. International carbon trade has developed for almost 20 years since the release of Kyoto Protocol in 1997. At present, China also conducted relevant policy researches on low carbon development. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform", which proposed that by 2020, "we will implement a trading system for energy conservation, carbon emission, waste discharge and water usage rights, establish a market-oriented mechanism to attract private capital to ecological and environmental protection, and implement third-party treatment of environmental pollution." Chinese carbon market has entered a rapid development period since then. Carbon trading will be the only way to lead the low-carbon economy [1] , and carbon trading will become an important part for the future economic development of all countries.
The strategic interaction between governments and enterprises always involves benefit game of all parties, thus the game theory is widely used in cooperation between government and enterprise. Scholars at home and abroad used game theory to study on energy conservation and emission reduction as well as carbon trade. Shrivastava P (1995) [2] indicated that businesses could gain competitive advantage by operating ecological variables. Guimaraes T, Liska K (1995) [3] proved that a company would obtain greater commercial interests if it has higher level of environmental management. Qinghua Zhu and Joseph Sarkis(2004) [4] proposed that China must balance economic and environmental performance, and green supply chain management is an important way to improve the performance of Chinese enterprises. A. Bernard, A. Haurie, M. Vielle and L. Viguier (2007) [5] proposed a dynamic game model for strategic competition among developing countries represented by Russia and China. Rui Zhao and Gareth Neighbour (2012) [6] stated that under the background of green supply chain management, manufacturers use strategy selection of game theory analysis to reduce environmental risks of lifecycle materials and carbon emissions. Most of these studies conduct game analysis from the perspective of the government or corporate unilaterally, and this paper will conduct complete information dynamic game analysis of government and enterprise decisions based on corporate carbon trading willingness, and discuss how government and enterprises take measures to achieve maximum benefits under different corporate carbon trading willingness.
INFLUENCING FACTOR ANALYSIS OF CARBON TRADING WILLINGNESS AND MODEL BUILDING
Theoretical assumption: a business is considered as an economic man pursuing the goal of maximum profit, who will conduct rational analysis on proceeds, cost and risks of carbon trade, thereby forming carbon trading willingness. The study will not discuss the impact of some irrational factors on carbon trading willingness that is not easily measured by economic models. The higher the expected net income of enterprises, the greater willingness of carbon trading; the greater the expected business risk, the less willingness of carbon trading. As an economic man, companies sell carbon trading quotas will avoid choosing business mode of low expected net income and high expected risks, so the company's risk preference is the key to the balance of risks and benefits.
The process of carbon trading is actually the transfer of carbon credits on carbon trading market. Therefore, this paper builds a model of carbon trading willingness based on the previous research [13] of transfer willingness:
Wherein, D refers to measurement index of carbon trading willingness; I 1 refers to net income of carbon quota transaction of marginal business; I 2 refers to net income of non-carbon quota transaction of marginal business; R 1 refers to risks of business activities of carbon trade; R 2 refers to risks from operating activities of non-carbon trade; and f refers to risk preference coefficient.
When f=0, the corporate risk preference is great. It indicates that an enterprise only considers items with great income from operation, but does not consider risk-benefit ratio; when 0<f<1, the corporate risk preference is great; when f=1, the corporate risk preference is medium; when f>1, the corporate risk preference is small; when f is infinitely great, the corporate risk preference is very small. It indicates that an enterprise only considers items with small operational risk, but does not consider risk-benefit ratio; when f<0, it indicates that an enterprise will choose items with less earnings and great risk, which does not conform to the assumption of the economic man. The smaller the value of f, the greater the risk preference is. Therefore, it is of great significance of determining the accurate f value. After determining an accurate f value, when D>1, an enterprise will choose carbon trade; when D=1, it states that the enterprise has no clear willingness; when D<1, it indicates that the enterprise will not choose carbon trade. The larger the value of D, the higher willingness of corporate carbon trade is.
BUILDING OF GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISE GAME MODEL
The government provides advice and guidance, and companies accept and implement it. As limited rational men, it is possible for the government and enterprises to become players of the game. Meanwhile, the government makes the first move, followed by enterprises. According to development changes of market, industries and enterprises, the government has two policy options: exercise supervisory duties on enterprises, supervising enterprises to implement carbon trading (referred to as "supervision"), for example, the government can regularly examine enterprises' carbon credits, and circumstances after entering the carbon trading market etc.; or does not supervise the firms to implement carbon trading (referred to as "non-supervision"); companies may choose strategies to implement carbon trading ("implementation"), for instance, actively check carbon credits and implement carbon trading after entering the carbon trading market, or do not have a clear willingness of carbon trading, choose wait-and-see policy ("wait and see"), or may choose measures not implementing carbon trading (referred to as "non-implementation").
This article makes explanations on earnings and costs of enterprises under different strategies:
C B refers to the cost of implementation strategy, including correlative charges concerning management and implementation of carbon trading. R B represents the earnings of implementation strategy, including earnings from the reduction of energy consumption, reduction of costs of trash discharge, and the increase of circular using of resource, as well as external revenue of carbon trade. C G indicates the cost of government regulation, including information cost as well as manpower and material costs and financial resources. R G stands for the income of government regulation, including the reduction of overall energy consumption and charges of pollutant discharge governance. F G refers to the penalty for enterprises that do not engage in carbon trading; S G stands for the subsidy to enterprises that are on the sidelines of carbon trading; A G refers to the reward given to enterprises engaging in carbon trade. P G represents the atmospheric controlling expenses paid by government if enterprises do not engage in carbon trade. See TABLE 1 for the meaning of these symbols. Suppose all participants' earnings are certain under any given strategy combination, then build a complete information dynamic game model. See Figure 1 
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF GAME
Equilibrium Analysis a. For subgame A, in case , enterprises choose to engage in carbon trading, and the matrix of earnings is ; i. For subgame B, in case enterprises choose to engage in carbon trading, and the matrix of earnings is ; For game C，in case ，then the government adopts regulatory measures, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (implementation, implementation)), and matrix of earnings is ；on the contrary, in case ，the government will not supervise, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (implementation, implementation)), and matrix of earnings is . ii. For subgame B, in case ，enterprises are on the sidelines or do not engage in carbon trading, and the matrix of earnings is ; At this time, for game C，in case ，then the government adopts regulatory measures, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (implementation, wait and see)), and matrix of earnings is ; in case , the government will not supervise, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (implementation, wait and see)) and (non-regulation, (implementation, non-implementation))，and matrix of earnings is .
b. For subgame A, in case , enterprises are on the sidelines, and the matrix of earnings is ; i． ． ． ． For subgame B, in case ，enterprises choose to engage in carbon trading, and the matrix of earnings is ； At this moment, for game C, in case ， then the government adopts regulatory measures, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (wait and see, implementation)), and matrix of earnings is ; in case , the government will not supervise, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (wait and see, implementation)), and matrix of earnings is . ii． ． ． ．For subgame B, in case , enterprises are on the sidelines or do not engage in carbon trading, and the matrix of earnings is ; At this moment, for game C, in case , then the government adopts regulatory measures, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (wait and see, wait and see)), and matrix of earnings is ; in case , the government will not supervise, and the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (wait and see, wait and see)) and (non-regulation, (wait and see, non-implementation)), and matrix of earnings is .
Comparative Analysis of Revenue of Government and Enterprise
a. In case matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (implementation, implementation)), matrix of earnings is , and total revenue of government and enterprise is ; the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (implementation, implementation)), matrix of earnings is , and total revenue of government and enterprise is . As ，when the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (implementation, implementation)), the total revenue is larger.
In case matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (implementation, wait and see)), matrix of earnings is , and total revenue of government and enterprise is ; the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (implementation, wait and see)) and (non-regulation, (implementation, non-implementation)), matrix of earnings is , and total revenue of government and enterprise is . At this moment, in case , when the strategy is (regulation, (implementation, wait and see)), the total revenue is larger, that is ; in case , the strategy is (non-regulation, (implementation, wait and see)) and (non-regulation, (implementation, non-implementation)), the total revenue is larger.
To sum up, when , when the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (implementation, implementation)), when matrix of earnings is , the total revenue is the largest, that is . b. In case matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (wait and see, implementation)), matrix of earnings is , the total revenue of government and enterprise is ; the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (wait and see, implementation)), matrix of earnings is , and the total revenue of government and enterprise is . As ， ， when the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (wait and see, implementation)), the total revenue is larger. In case matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (wait and see, wait and see)), matrix of earnings is , the total revenue of government and enterprise is ; the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (non-regulation, (wait and see, wait and see)) and (non-regulation, (wait and see, non-implementation)), matrix of earnings is , and the total revenue of government and enterprise is . As , when the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (wait and see, wait and see)), the total revenue is larger.
In conclusion, when , the matrix of government and enterprise strategy is (regulation, (wait and see, implementation)) and (regulation, (wait and see, wait and see)), when the matrix of earnings is , the total revenue is the largest, that is .
CONCLUSION
This paper explores the game analysis of government and enterprises in carbon trading. From the complete information dynamic game model, we can draw the conclusion that when enterprises' willingness D＞1, the enterprises tend to engage in carbon trading, the government should take regulatory policies and give rewards to such enterprises. It is in favor of improving the benefit of social ecological civilization construction; when enterprises' willingness 0＜D＜1, the enterprises are still at unfamiliar state for carbon trading, and will not easily take action on carbon trading, the government should take regulatory policies and give policy subsidies to such enterprises to improve their enthusiasm in carbon trading, which contributes to the ecological civilization construction and the establishment of national carbon-trading market; when enterprises' willingness D＜0, it indicates that such enterprises reject carbon trading, if the government fails to supervise, it would decrease the overall efficiency of ecological civilization construction, therefore, the government shall impose proper punishments to enhance the overall earnings and actively promote the carbon trade. We can see from this study that when , the government takes regulatory policies, and enterprises engage in carbon trading, the overall efficiency will be the largest; when , the government takes regulatory policies, and enterprises are still wait and see, maximum benefit will be achieved. Government and enterprises under different input and output will get different benefits, therefore, the government and enterprises should adjust strategies based on the actual situation.
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